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Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade |
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Anna
Rita Bennato and Tommaso Valletti |
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IJIO(2014) |
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This paper proposes a North¡VSouth model to
study the interaction between price regulation policies and parallel trade,
with a particular focus on the pharmaceutical sector. We show that, under
parallel trade, R&D investment can rise only when the South government
takes into full account its impact both on investment and on the firm's decision to supply the regulated country. This
arises because of a complete withdrawal from price regulation. When policy choices are endogenized,
indeed the South wants to achieve this level of full commitment when it is
large in size. When instead it is smaller in size, the South chooses an intermediate
form of commitment whereby it anticipates its effect only on local
distribution and delivery, but not on global R&D investment. As a response to these credible levels of
price control commitments, the North reacts by allowing parallel imports from
the South. |