研討日期	2014年10月11日10:30 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院710討論室
題目	Quality Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly
作者	Chih-Yi Hsu Ray-Yun Chang Cheng-Hau Peng
文獻出處	Working paper
報告人	張瑞雲
參加人員	黃鴻、王光正、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、丁虹仁、王羿傑、呂得成、曹古駒、許至乙、吳尚弈、施姵全
摘要	This paper investigates the optimal licensing contract for product innovation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly in which a high-quality firm competes with other low-quality firms. We find that the high-quality firm will never license its technology to all the low-quality firms if there are more than two low-quality firms. In addition, the number of licensees increases as the quality gap decreases, which is a result that has never been documented in the literature and reflects reality. We also present that fixed fee licensing is more profitable for the licensor, if the quality difference is small, which is opposite to that noted in the cost-reducing licensing literature. We further show that under certain circumstances, fixed fee licensing is less socially desirable than royalty licensing. Finally, if the licensor firm adopts a two-part tariff contract, then the optimal contract may consist of a pure royalty, a positive royalty and a positive fixed fee, or a pure fixed fee, varying with the number of low-quality firms and the quality gap between the two types of products.