研討日期

2014101110:30 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

An analysis of the MFN clause under partial ownership

Hong-Ren Din

Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang

Wen-Jung Liang

Working paper

報告人

丁虹仁

參加人員

黃鴻王光正、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、丁虹仁、王羿傑、呂得成、曹古駒、許至乙、吳尚弈、施姵全

論文提要

   This paper conducts a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two importing countries and one domestic country. It is shown that the optimal discriminatory tariff schedule for the domestic country is to impose lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient importing firm. Moreover, we show that MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a global world welfare perspective when firm A holds a relative small equity interest in firm B. In particular, when the equity share δA is larger, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN. We also present that consumer surplus and firm A prefer a uniform tariff regime, whereas firm B prefer a discriminatory tariff regime the equity share δA is small. Consumer surplus and firm A prefer a discriminatory tariff regime, whereas firm B prefer a uniform tariff regime the equity share δA is larger.

研究建議