研討日期

2014年10月4日10:30 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

題目

Corporate Social Responsibility and Endogenous Competition

Structure

作者

Toshihiro Matsumura and Akira Ogawa

文獻出處

Working paper

報告人

Toshihiro Matsumura

參加人員

松村敏弘、黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、陳宏易、蔡明芳、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、林晏如、王羿傑、呂得成、周冰瑤、施姵全

摘要

(1) We assume that the firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and revisit the endogenous choice of price or quantity contract. We find that symmetric (asymmetric) attitude toward CSR yield Cournot (Bertrand) competition.

(2) We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms’ payoffs. Pal (1998, Economics Letters) investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing private firms. He shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to his result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare-concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly.