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Corporate Social Responsibility and Endogenous Competition Structure |
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Toshihiro
Matsumura and Akira Ogawa |
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Working paper |
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Toshihiro
Matsumura |
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(1) We assume that the firms care
about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and revisit the endogenous choice
of price or quantity contract. We find that symmetric (asymmetric) attitude
toward CSR yield Cournot (Bertrand) competition. (2) We revisit an endogenous timing game by
introducing corporate social responsibility into firms¡¦ payoffs. Pal (1998, Economics Letters) investigates
an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one
welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing private firms.
He shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In
contrast to his result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as
long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result
indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare-concerning objectives, yields specific
results in the literature on mixed oligopoly. |