¬ã°Q¤é´Á

2014¦~10¤ë4¤é10:30 ~ 12:00

¬ã°Q¦aÂI

¥x¤jªÀ·|¬ì¾Ç°|710°Q½×«Ç

ÃD¥Ø

Corporate Social Responsibility and Endogenous Competition

Structure

§@ªÌ

Toshihiro Matsumura and Akira Ogawa

¤åÄm¥X³B

Working paper

³ø§i¤H

Toshihiro Matsumura

°Ñ¥[¤H­û

ªQ§ø±Ó¥°¡B¶ÀÂE¡B±ç¤åºa¡BªL¿P²Q¡B³¯§»©ö¡B½²©úªÚ¡B±i·ç¶³¡B´^¥¿¯E¡B°ª°ê峯¡B³¯ª÷²±¡BªL®Ë¦p¡B¤ý¬ý³Ç¡B§f±o¦¨¡B©P¦Bº½¡B¬IÎr¥þ

ºK­n

(1) We assume that the firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and revisit the endogenous choice of price or quantity contract. We find that symmetric (asymmetric) attitude toward CSR yield Cournot (Bertrand) competition.

(2) We revisit an endogenous timing game by introducing corporate social responsibility into firms¡¦ payoffs. Pal (1998, Economics Letters) investigates an endogenous timing game in a mixed oligopoly, wherein one welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing private firms. He shows that the outcome is completely different from that of private oligopoly. In contrast to his result, we find that this change in payoff does not matter as long as the payoffs are symmetric. Our result indicates that asymmetry, and not welfare-concerning objectives, yields specific results in the literature on mixed oligopoly.