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Bundling,
Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis |
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Avenali, D¡¦Annuzio,
and Reverberi |
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Review of
Industrial Organization (2013) |
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We
investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive
welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in
a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist¡¦s preferred strategy,
since it either extracts surplus from the rival¡¦s investment, or forces the
rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing
the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since
prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for
bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality
investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the ¡¥do-nothing¡¦ scenario. We
consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible. |