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Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis

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Avenali, D¡¦Annuzio, and Reverberi

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Review of Industrial Organization (2013)

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We investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist¡¦s preferred strategy, since it either extracts surplus from the rival¡¦s investment, or forces the rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the ¡¥do-nothing¡¦ scenario. We consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible.