研討日期

演講時間:20140927  12:00 ~ 13:10

研討地點

台大社會科學院710討論室

題目

Bundling, Competition and Quality Investment: A Welfare Analysis

作者

Avenali, D’Annuzio, and Reverberi

文獻出處

Review of Industrial Organization (2013)

演講者

暳陵

參加人員

梁文榮、林燕淑、蔡明芳、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、鍾暳陵、林晏如、丁虹仁、許至乙、林季萱、吳尚弈、呂得成、周冰瑤、施姵全

摘要

We investigate how bundling affects investment in product quality, and derive welfare implications. A monopolist in a primary market competes with a rival in a complementary market. Bundling is the monopolist’s preferred strategy, since it either extracts surplus from the rival’s investment, or forces the rival to provide low quality. Bundling may reduce welfare without foreclosing the rival, but improves welfare when preventing undesirable investment. Since prohibiting bundling is not appropriate, we introduce a price test for bundled offers that preserves efficiencies from both bundling and quality investment, thereby improving welfare relative to the ‘do-nothing’ scenario. We consequently argue that this test should be applied whenever possible.