研討日期

2014072610:30 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院27教室

題目

International Technology Transfer and Welfare

作者

Cheng-Hau Peng, Ping-Shin Kuo and Yan-Shu Lin

文獻出處

Working paper

報告人

Cheng-Hau Peng

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、吳芝文、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、鍾暳陵、周冰瑤、施姵全

摘要

This paper investigates the welfare effect of international technology transfer. We assume that there are two domestic firms, producing vertically differentiated products. A foreign innovator with a higher quality product engages in international technology transfer and licenses its innovation to the domestic firm(s) via a fixed fee licensing contract. The game in question consists of two stages. In the first stage, the foreign firm determines its optimal licensing contract. In the second stage, the two domestic firms compete in either Bertrand or Cournot fashion in the market. It is found that the foreign innovator will license exclusively to the high-quality firm under Bertrand competition whereas it may licenses to the high-quality firm, the low-quality firm or both under Cournot competition, depending on the quality gaps between the three products. Further, when the transferred new quality is not much superior to the domestic ones and the competition between the domestic firms is weak, international technology licensing is definitely welfare-reducing under both competition modes.