研討日期

2014年月日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

題目

Antidumping Retaliation and Product R&D

作者

Kuo-Feng Kao and Cheng-Hau Peng

文獻出處

Working Paper

報告人

高國騟

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、吳芝文、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國騟、陳金盛、鍾噺陵、周冰瑤、施姵全

 

摘要

This paper aims to explain two important phenomenon, that is, why anti-dumping retaliation occurs and whether anti-dumping retaliation makes anti-dumping protection more likely or less likely to happen. It is found that firms’ product R&D played an important role. Unilateral anti-dumping policy discourages the R&D incentive of the protected firm while it stimulates that of the constrained firm. In addition, the total product R&D investment is lower than that under free trade, which in turn may deteriorate the profit of protected firm. However, the profit of the protected firm increases. Moreover, we show that the constrained firm has the incentive to petition for a fight-back anti-dumping policy only if the level of product R&D can be endogenously determined. Finally, such an anti-dumping retaliation increases the incentive of the protected firm to petition for an anti-dumping protection only if the level of product R&D is large enough; otherwise, anti-dumping retaliations discourage the protected firm to petition for an anti-dumping protection.