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Vertical distribution, parallel trade, and
price divergence in integrated markets |
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Mattias Ganslandt
and Keith E. Maskus |
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EER(2007) |
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We develop a model of vertical pricing in
which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are
integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). The
manufacturing firm needs to set these two prices to balance three competing
interests: restricting competition in the PI-recipient market, avoiding
resource wastes due to actual trade, and reducing the double-markup problem
in the PI-source nation. These tradeoffs imply the counterintuitive result
that retail prices could diverge as a result of declining trading costs, even
as the volume of PI increases. Thus, in some circumstances it may be
misleading to think that permitting PI is an unambiguous force for price integration. |