研討日期

2014412日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

題目

Aggressive leaders

作者

Federico Etro

文獻出處

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 146–154

報告人

陳金盛

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、蔡明芳、張瑞雲、陳金盛、呂得成、宋育芳、王羿傑、施

摘要

In this paper the author characterizes the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competition and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of firms, when the investment increases marginal profitability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. It is shown that the purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the firm to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other firms. Contrary to the post-Chicago approach, this paper shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily associated with exclusionary purposes.