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Equilibrium parallel import policies and international

market structure

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Roy and Saggi

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JIE (2012)

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In this paper, we endogenize PI policies in a North-South duopoly

model where the Northern firm produces the high quality and the

Southern firm the low quality. Key result - and one that matches quite well with the observed nature of real world national PI policies - is that if the Northern demand and, more particularly, preference for high quality is sufficiently higher than that of the South, the North forbids PIs and international price discrimination obtains as the equilibrium outcome. When demand heterogeneity across markets is high, by preventing indirect competition from arbitrage-induced PIs, the Northern prohibition on PIs induces direct competition in both markets. Only when markets are relatively similar in demand structure does the North choose to permit PIs and obtain its most preferred market outcome -i.e. uniform pricing- as an equilibrium outcome.