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Equilibrium parallel import policies and
international market structure |
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Roy and Saggi |
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JIE (2012) |
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In this paper, we endogenize
PI policies in a North-South duopoly model where the Northern firm produces the
high quality and the Southern firm the low quality. Key result - and one that matches
quite well with the observed nature of real world national PI policies - is
that if the Northern demand and, more particularly, preference for high
quality is sufficiently higher than that of the
South, the North forbids PIs and international price discrimination obtains
as the equilibrium outcome. When demand heterogeneity across markets is high,
by preventing indirect competition from arbitrage-induced PIs, the Northern prohibition
on PIs induces direct competition in both markets. Only when markets are
relatively similar in demand structure does the North choose to permit PIs
and obtain its most preferred market outcome -i.e. uniform pricing- as an
equilibrium outcome. |