研討日期

20140308上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   26教室

題目

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

作者

Pedro P. Barros and Luís Cabral

文獻出處

Review of International Economics, 8(2), 360–371, 2000

報告人

王羿傑

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、蔡明芳、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、許至乙、呂得成、周冰瑤、宋育芳、王羿傑、施姵全

論文提要

The paper analyzes “subsidy games” between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or “central”) country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.

 

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