研討日期	2014年3月1日10:30 ~ 12:10
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Vertical Production Innovation and Parallel Imports
作者	CHANGYING LI
文獻出處	SER(2005)
報告人	施姵全
參加人員	梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、陳宏易、吳芝文、張瑞雲、彭正浩、陳金盛、許至乙、呂得成、丁虹仁、王羿傑、宋育芳、吳尚弈、施姵全
摘要	In this paper, we review the debate concerning the impact of parallel imports on vertical product innovation by the original manufacturer. We contribute to the literature of PI by developing a formal model of vertical pricing control with which our question is easy to be analyzed. We find that in equilibrium both the manufacturer and the distributor do not supply the low-quality product if the innovation is successful. If parallel imports are prohibited among the distributors’ countries and there is at least one country other than the manufacturer’s homeland in which there is only one distributor, then allowing reimports reduces the manufacturer’s incentive to innovate. Otherwise, permitting reimports has no effect on the manufacturer’s incentive to invest in R&D. Moreover under the assumption of Bertrand competition, either delegating more than one distributor in countries outside the manufacturer’s homeland or allowing parallel imports among the distributors’ countries can maximize the manufacturer’s total profit regardless of whether innovation is successful.