研討日期	2014年2月22日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Signaling and Licensing
作者	Cheng-Hau Peng andCheng-Tai Wu
文獻出處	Working paper
報告人	Cheng-Hau Peng
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、彭正浩、蔡明芳、張瑞雲、高國峯、陳金盛、許至乙、呂得成、周冰瑤、丁虹仁、宋育芳、吳尚弈、施姵全
討論提要	Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) analyze licensing contract in an monopolistic industry in the presence of asymmetric information. We extend their analysis to an oligopolistic industry, in which the number of the license sold is endogenously determined. We find that in the separating equilibrium that the license are sold to all downstream firms, the efficient innovator uses a higher but suboptimal royalty to signal its type. Furthermore, we characterize the separating equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of the efficient type innovator, and find that the efficient type innovator may use the number of the license sold, instead of a higher royalty, to signal its type.
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