研討日期	2014年01月25日10:30 ~ 12:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer
作者	Alireza Naghavi
文獻出處	Review of World Economics (2007)
報告人	呂得成
參加人員	黃鴻、林燕淑、梁文榮、王光正、蔡明芳、王佳琪、彭正浩、陳金盛、高國峯、呂得成、丁虹仁、王羿傑、許至乙、周冰瑤、吳尚弈、施姵全
摘要	The South always prefers constrained monopoly to duopoly under FDI. This is due to the large amount of innovation that takes place by the Northern firm in the case of strategic predation as an attempt to block entry into the market. The South must therefore set a sufficiently strong IPR level of βˆ or below to prevent duopoly from being a viable outcome. This switches the optimal policy to β^∗∗, which is 0.11 at g = 1.81 and is falling in g to match the export profits. Recall that exports become more attractive as g increases due to τ^∗ getting closer to zero. Ultimately β^∗∗reaches zero at g = 2, where only full IPR protection can assure FDI. A stringent IPR regime is always optimal for the South as it triggers technology transfer by inducing FDI in less R&D-intensive industries and stimulates innovation by pushing multinationals to deter entry in high-technology sectors.