研討日期

2012年11月17日10:30 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

   Dynamic Games of R&D Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly

Changying Li   Jianhu Zhang

Working paper

報告人

李長英

參加人員

李長英、黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、王光正、涂光億、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、林晏如、呂得成、張志偉、周冰瑤、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

摘要

(1) The stationary levels of R&D and quality for the open-loop strategies are socially optimal.

(2) The stationary feedback levels of R&D, quality, consumer surplus and social welfare are always lower than their open-loop counterparts; the opposite then is true with regard to firms’ prices and profits.

(3)  Product differentiation does not impact the stationary levels of R&D and quality under the open-loop model, but it negatively affects the stationary levels of R&D and quality under the feedback model.

(4) R&D investment remains higher for a firm with an initial   quality advantage during the market evolution; however, the levels of R&D and product qualities of the two firms will ultimately converge to stationary points.