研討日期

2012102710:30 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

REGULATED INPUT PRICE, VERTICAL SEPARATION, AND LEADERSHIP IN FREE ENTRY MARKETS  

Toshihiro Matsumura

  Noriaki Matsushima

Working paper

報告人

Toshihiro Matsumura

參加人員

松村敏弘 (Toshihiro Matsumura)、黃鴻、林燕淑、梁文榮、王光正、吳芝文、蔡明芳、林晏如、王羿傑、丁虹仁、暳陵、呂得成、周冰瑤、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

摘要

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products. The bottleneck facility holder affects the regulated input price. We investigate how vertical separation affects the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. We find that the results depend on whether the incumbent is the Stackelberg leader in the product market. If the incumbent cannot take leadership in the product market and faces Cournot competition, vertical separation reduces the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. The opposite result is derived when the incumbent can take leadership in the product market.