研討日期	2012年10月6日上午10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院 法26教室
討論文獻	題目	作者	文獻出處
	On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information	Patrick W. Schmitz	Journal of Economic Theory 106, 177–189 (2002)
報告人	吳宜謙
參加人員	煩請老師或學姊為我查詢…
論文提要	Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms’ benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information.
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