研討日期

2012929日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   26教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behavior

 

 

Nori Tarui

and  Stephen Polasky

 

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50 (2005) 447–467

 

報告人

周冰瑤

參加人員

王光正、陳宏易、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、鍾暳陵、周冰瑤、吳宜謙、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

論文提要

We analyze a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting firm. We compare environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated upon learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty, neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an efficient solution except in special cases. When there is little uncertainty, rules are superior to discretion because discretionary policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future regulation. However, when uncertainty is large, discretion is superior to rules because it allows regulation to incorporate new information. Taxes are superior to standards under discretion regardless of the relative slopes of marginal costs and marginal damages for the case of quadratic abatement costs and damages.

 

備註