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Market structure and strategic
bi-sourcing |
Hamid Beladi and
Arijit Mukherjee |
Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 82 (2012) 210-219 |
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International trade in inputs, often referred to as
international outsourcing, is not a new phenomenon. In
recent years, the literature on international outsourcing started focusing on
its strategic and organizational aspects (see Kierzkowski, 2005 and
Spencer, 2005, for surveys). While the emphasis of this literature lies on
the make-or-buy decisions of the firms, an important
organizational arrangement, where a firm acquires the same set of inputs both
by purchasing from external suppliers and carrying out in-house production,
did not get much attention. However, there are ample evidences showing the make-and-buy
strategies of the firms, which we refer to as bi-sourcing. |
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In-house input production reduces the price charged by
the outside input supplier, and may make bi-sourcing as a profitable
strategy. Under bi-sourcing, the final goods producers may be better off by
outsourcing to a common input supplier than by outsourcing to different input
suppliers. In the presence of bi-sourcing, the final goods producers may not
have the incentive for cooperation in the product market. Our results show
that even if the final goods producer¡¦s marginal cost of in-house input production
is higher than the outside supplier¡¦s marginal cost of input production,
bi-sourcing makes the consumers better off compared to complete outsourcing. |
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