研討日期

研討日期	2012年08月25日10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Bargaining over managerial delegation contracts and merger incentives with asymmetric costs
作者	Yasuhiko Nakamura
文獻出處	The Manchester School, 79, 2011
報告人	曾靜枝
參加人員	黃鴻、梁文榮、王光正、陳宏易、蔡明芳、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、曾靜枝、丁虹仁、鍾暳陵、林季萱、呂得成、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全
摘要	In this paper, we examine how managerial delegation contracts within each firm affect the correspondence between the equilibrium ownership structure and the most socially preferred ownership structure. We consider the disclosure of managerial delegation contracts by studying the bargaining over the relative weightage of each firm’s sales in a sales delegation contract between an owner and a manager under a model of endogenous merger formation in a three-firm asymmetric Cournot industry. We show that such a bargaining may reduce the requirement of an antitrust policy, since the equilibrium ownership structure can coincide with the most socially preferred ownership structure.
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