研討日期

2012年7月14日10:20 ~ 11:30

研討地點

台大社會科學院第27教室

題目

The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist

作者

Nicholas Economides

文獻出處

International Journal of Industrial Organization (1998)

報告人

高國峯

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、王光正、陳宏易、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、周冰瑤、曾靜枝、蔡明芳、涂光億、王佳琪、王羿傑、丁虹仁、張志瑋、呂得成、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

摘要

This paper considers the incentive for non-price discrimination of a monopolist in an input market who also sells in an oligopoly downstream market through a subsidiary. Such a monopolist can raise the costs of the rivals to its subsidiary though discriminatory quality degradation. I find that the monopolist always, even when it is cost-disadvantaged, has the incentive to raise the costs of the rivals to its subsidiary in a discriminatory fashion, but does not have the incentive to raise costs to the whole downstream industry including its subsidiary. Moreover, increasing rivals’ costs nullifies the effects of traditional imputation floors, and prompts the creation of imputation floors that account for the artificial costs imposed on downstream rivals. The results of this paper raise concerns about the potentially anti-competitive effects of entry of local exchange carriers in long distance service. The results may also suggest the imposition of certain unbundling and technical specification disclosure requirements to monopolists in high technology industries.

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