研討日期	2012年7月7日10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院社法26教室
題目	Mixed oligopoly, privatization, subsidization, and the order of firms' moves: Several types of objectives
作者	Kazuhiko Kato and Yoshihiro Tomaru
文獻出處	Economics Letters 96 (2007) 287–292
報告人	陳金盛
參加人員	黃鴻、梁文榮、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、周冰瑤、王羿傑、丁虹仁、呂得成、吳宜謙、吳定軒、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全
摘要	In a real world, the private firms do not always seem to be profit maximizers, however. Kaneda and Matsui (2003) pointed it out and presented an n-firm Cournot oligopoly model in which each firm's objective is to maximize the weighted average of its own profits and another factor. If the private firms have other objectives which are slightly different from maximization of their own profits, this paper find that he optimal subsidy level, all firms' profits, the output level and welfare are identical regardless of whether (a) the public firm and all n private firms choose their output simultaneously, (b) the public firm is privatized and all n+1 private firms choose their output simultaneously, or (c) the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader and all n private firms do as Stackelberg followers. These results are obtained in the model where a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with profit-maximizing private firms.
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