研討日期

研討日期	2012年06月23日 10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院第26教室
討論題目	題目	作者	文獻出處
	Bundling, Quality Choice, and Welfare	Hui-Ling Chung
報告人	鍾暳陵
參加人員	林燕淑、梁文榮、吳芝文、王光正、張民忠、林晏如、蔡明芳、王佳琪、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、張志偉、丁虹仁、鍾暳陵、呂得成、吳宜謙、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全
討論提要	This paper investigates the quality competition and the welfare effects of commodity bundling by a multi-product firm in a vertically differentiated industry. We discuss two cases in which a multi-product firm bundles a high (low) quality product against a low (high) quality rival firm in the competitive market.
討論結果與建議	Within the context of bundled high quality good, we show that bundling reduces the quality level of competitive good produced by both firms and decreases the consumer surplus and welfare. The main reason is that multi-product firm uses bundling to extend its monopoly power to the competitive market to take more profits from rival firm by means of lower its own quality. In order to mitigate the competition, the best response of rival firm is to further differentiate the quality levels, which induces rival firm to bring down its own quality level, too. On the contrary, under the bundled low quality good case, bundling raises the quality level of competitive good, enhances the consumer surplus, and may increase the welfare. Although bundling alters the optimal quality level in the two cases, there is no discrepancy in the two equilibrium quality differentiation of the competitive market.
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