研討日期

20120623  10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   26教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Bundling, Quality Choice, and Welfare

Hui-Ling Chung

 

報告人

暳陵

參加人員

林燕淑、梁文榮、吳芝文、王光正、張民忠、林晏如、蔡明芳、王佳琪、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、張志偉、丁虹仁、鍾暳陵、呂得成、吳宜謙、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

討論提要

This paper investigates the quality competition and the welfare effects of commodity bundling by a multi-product firm in a vertically differentiated industry.  We discuss two cases in which a multi-product firm bundles a high (low) quality product against a low (high) quality rival firm in the competitive market.

討論結果與建議

Within the context of bundled high quality good, we show that bundling reduces the quality level of competitive good produced by both firms and decreases the consumer surplus and welfare.  The main reason is that multi-product firm uses bundling to extend its monopoly power to the competitive market to take more profits from rival firm by means of lower its own quality.  In order to mitigate the competition, the best response of rival firm is to further differentiate the quality levels, which induces rival firm to bring down its own quality level, too. 

On the contrary, under the bundled low quality good case, bundling raises the quality level of competitive good, enhances the consumer surplus, and may increase the welfare. Although bundling alters the optimal quality level in the two cases, there is no discrepancy in the two equilibrium quality differentiation of the competitive market.

備註