研討日期

2012年06月16日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第26教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Welfare-reducing mergers in differentiated oligopolies with free entry

Nisvan Erkal

Daniel Piccinin

Economic Record 2010

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、陳宏易、王光正、張民忠、林晏如、張瑞雲、彭正浩、陳金盛、周冰瑤、曾靜枝、涂光億、張志偉、丁虹仁、王羿傑、鍾暳陵、呂得成、周品旭、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全

論文提要

  In the analysis of the effects of mergers, it is important to consider the impact of merger-generated efficiencies on the possibility of post-merger entry. Although antitrust authorities consider both merger-generated efficiencies and entry as factors which may counteract the negative effects of horizontal mergers, the link between them is not emphasized in their guidelines.

  In a model with endogenous entry and differentiated products, we have shown that the net effect on consumer welfare is dominated by cost efficiencies in the sense that consumer welfare is increasing in the level of cost efficiencies. Mergers which do not generate any cost savings strictly hurt consumer welfare. It is not necessarily desirable to have more entry because more entry following a merger implies that the merger-generated efficiencies were not sufficiently large. In fact, mergers which induce entry always harm consumer welfare whereas mergers which induce exit always improve consumer welfare.

研究建議

It is well-known that the mergers always occur when the market is less competitive. Thus, it is worth to note that the assumption of N firms which can either enter or exit the market is reasonable.

備註