研討日期	2012年5月12日10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院社法26教室
題目	Optimal Licensing Contract and Entry under Cournot Competition
作者	Chin-Sheng Chen
文獻出處	Working paper
報告人	陳金盛
參加人員	黃鴻、梁文榮、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、周冰瑤、王羿傑、丁虹仁、呂得成、吳宜謙、吳定軒、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全
摘要	This paper investigates the optimal licensing contract of an insider licensor in a homogeneous-good market with a potential entrant. We find that fixed fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing if the entry cost incurred the potential entrant is not too high. It is because that that licensing by means of fixed fee has merit on extracting the licensing rent from entry deterrence. To deter the entry, conversely, the licensor if adopting royalty has to sacrifice part of the cost advantage against the incumbent licensee. In a general setting where the licensor can decide the number of licensee, this conclusion holds true as long as the entry cost is moderate.
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