研討日期	2012年4月14日上午10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院 法26教室
討論文獻	題目	作者	文獻出處
	Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter	Joan Canton Antoine Soubeyran Hubert Stahn	Environ Resource Econ (2008) 40:369–382
報告人	周冰瑤
參加人員	黃鴻、梁文榮、林燕淑、吳芝文、王光正、林晏如、張瑞雲、彭正浩、高國峯、陳金盛、周冰瑤、曾靜枝、蔡明芳、涂光億、王佳琪、王羿傑、張志瑋、呂得成、吳宜謙、吳定軒、蘇安琪、黃品錚、許至乙、施姵全
論文提要	This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.
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