研討日期

2012年04月07日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market:
 FDI versus Joint Ventures

 

 

Leahy and Naghavi

 

Review of International Economics

2010

報告人

王佳琪

參加人員

黃鴻、陳宏易、王光正、彭正浩、張瑞雲、高國峯、鍾暳陵、陳金盛、王佳琪、丁虹仁、王羿傑、吳宜謙、周冰瑤、蔡明芳、呂得成、吳定軒、許至乙、施姵全

 

討論提要

The role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the global economy is increasingly important. Foreign investment by MNEs can take several forms: FDI, licensing, acquisition, or joint venture (JV). The purpose of this paper is to ask whether FDI or JV is MNEs prefer under different circumstances and whether their preferred market structure can be an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it shows that strengthening the IPR regime can encourages JVs and with it technology transfer. This paper is the first theoretical paper to looks at IPR issues surrounding JVs.

 

結論

l   This paper study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country on  MNE’s entry mode (JV or FDI).

l   Entering a JV increases the exposure of the MNE’s technology to imitation.

l   JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong.

l   If Northern firm has all the bargaining power and IPRs are fully protected then a JV will be inferior to direct FDI from the point of view of Southern welfare.

l   If S firm owns all the bargaining power and the level of R&D effectiveness is above a threshold level, the welfare under JV is higher than that under FDI.

 

備註