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Social comparisons and the firm¡¦s profits:

An advantage of rewarding equal workers unequally

Oded Stark

Agnieszka Dorn

Yong Wang

Working paper

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Yong Wang

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This paper analyzes the impact of social comparisons on a firm¡¦s  profits and an optimal incentive structure. When workers are equally productive, the differences in how they are treated can arise from a firm¡¦s profit-maximizing decisions rather than from differences in  workers¡¦ productivity or employers¡¦ preferences. When a worker derives (dis)utility not only from the amount of effort he puts in but also from comparing  his earnings unfavorably with those of his  coworkers, his response to his sense of ¡§relative deprivation¡¨ is to  increase his level of effort. In the presence of such social comparisons, the firm can increase its profits by offering different contracts to equally productive workers.