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The Mode of Backward Integration:
Technology Licensing and R&D |
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Kuo-Feng Kao, Hong-Ren Din, and Pei-Cyuan Shih |
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Working Paper |
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Kuo-Feng Kao |
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In this
paper, we consider two modes of backward integration: Investing in R&D
and technology licensing. If the downstream firm backward integrates by
investing in R&D, the consumer surplus increases; however, the social welfare
increases only if the technology gap is not too large. On the other hand, if
the downstream firm backward integrates by technology licensing, the social
welfare necessarily increases; however, the consumer surplus increases only
if the innovation is large enough. That is because the patent holder can make
the downstream firms become more collusive by manipulating the royalty rate,
and the royalty rate may even larger than the technology gap. |
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