研討日期

20123310:30 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

討論題目

題目

作者

文獻出處

Technology Licensing with Asymmetric Cost-reducing Innovation

張志偉

林燕淑

Working paper

報告人

張志偉

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、王光正、彭正浩、張民忠、陳宏易、陳金盛、曾靜枝、丁虹仁、王羿傑、吳宜謙、蔡明芳、暳陵、張志瑋、呂得成、吳定軒、徐靖、施姵全

摘要

p  This paper establishes a duopoly model, which is distinct from the existing literature on technology licensing with same cost-reducing level, to investigate which licensing regime is superior for patent-holder when the licensing with cost-reducing is asymmetry. We find that, under fixed-fee (royalty) licensing, the patent-holder may license her innovation to the less-efficient (more-efficient) firm only if the relative cost-reduction ratio is large (small) enough. In addition, we show that the option of the licensing regimes depends not only on the extent in cost reducing when licensing occurs, but also on the number of licensees.