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Unionised Labour
Market and Strategic Production of a Multinational |
Arijit Mukherjee |
The Economic
Journal, 2008 |
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This is the first
article to analyze the co-existence of export and FDI with certainty in the unionized labor market. If the market is small (c<a<3/2c),
total output and labor demand in the foreign country are small. The foreign
wage rate (w1=a/2) sufficiently lower than the
domestic wage rate (c), which induces firm 1 to use FO (entry mode
of FDI Only). If the market size is
moderate (3/2c<a<ac), firm 1 use EF (mode of
Export and FDI) can reduce the foreign wage rate (w1
=(a+12c)/18) below the domestic wage rate (c) and the wage rate
that it has to pay if it uses FO, and also gets some first mover advantage. So, firm
1 prefers EF. If the market is
large (a>ac), the benefit of first mover advantage under EO (Export
Only) dominates the loss of higher wage rate (c). Firm 1 uses EO. The competition of a foreign firm reduces firm 1¡¦s incentive to
manipulate the foreign wage rate by export. The range of demand parameter for
which firm 1 uses EF is lower under duopoly. The positive amount of export helps
firm 1 to get first mover advantage which increases the incentive for selling
through export. If the labor market is unionized, a multinational use EF depends on the product market size, the fixed cost of FDI and whether there is competition or not in the product market. |