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Technology Licensing in Intermediated Good Market

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Chin-Sheng Chen, Hong Hwang and Pei-Cyuan Shih

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Working paper

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It is well known in the licensing literature that for a downstream market with a duopolistic structure and a homogeneous product, an insider oligopolistic always prefers to license its technology to its rival firms via a royalty contract. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust for an upstream market if there is potential entry in the downstream market. This paper examines the optimal licensing modes of an upstream licensor in an oligopolistic vertically-related market consisting of an upstream market and a downstream market.

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