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Mixed
oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration |
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Leonard F.S. Wang Tai-Liang Chen |
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Economic Modelling, 28, 2011 |
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This paper
examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed
oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic
market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or
exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of
privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of
multinational firms. We show that an increase in domestic ownership of
multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social
welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With
the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in
general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular,
the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms. |
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