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Strategic R&D with Technology Licensing and Welfare |
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Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau
Peng |
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Working paper, 2012 |
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This paper sets up a three-stage
(R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which one of
the firms undertakes cost-reducing R&D and licenses the developed
technology to the others. The technology licensing is carried out via a
two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit
royalty and an upfront fee). It is found that licensing does
not necessarily raise the firm¡¦s R&D investment. Moreover, social welfare
may go lower under licensing than no licensing. This result implies that a
government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among
firms. |
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