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| ÃD¥Ø | Strategic R&D with Technology Licensing and Welfare | 
| §@ªÌ | Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau
  Peng | 
| ¤åÄm¥X³B | Working paper, 2012 | 
| ³ø§i¤H | ±i·ç¶³ | 
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| ºKn | This paper sets up a three-stage
  (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which one of
  the firms undertakes cost-reducing R&D and licenses the developed
  technology to the others. The technology licensing is carried out via a
  two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit
  royalty and an upfront fee). It is found that licensing does
  not necessarily raise the firm¡¦s R&D investment. Moreover, social welfare
  may go lower under licensing than no licensing. This result implies that a
  government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among
  firms. | 
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