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 Strategic R&D with Technology Licensing and Welfare

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Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau Peng

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Working paper, 2012

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This paper sets up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which one of the firms undertakes cost-reducing R&D and licenses the developed technology to the others. The technology licensing is carried out via a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and an upfront fee). It is found that licensing does not necessarily raise the firm¡¦s R&D investment. Moreover, social welfare may go lower under licensing than no licensing. This result implies that a government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among firms.

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