研討日期	2020年11月30日上午10:20~ 12:30
研討地點	國立臺灣大學710討論室
主講題目 Title of the paper	How to Compete? Cournot versus Bertrand in a Vertical Structure with an Integrated Input Supplier
作者 Authors of the paper	Luciano Fanti and Marcella Scrimitore
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp	Southern Economic Journal 2019, 85(3), 796–820
主講人	丁虹仁
參加人員	王羿傑、林燕淑、施姵全、梁文榮、黃鴻、洪珮瑜、劉洋、林虢楙、陳彥勳、許至乙、周宗翰
摘要 Abstract of the paper	We study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and its retail competitor in a differentiated duopoly. Using a similar vertical structure, Arya et al. (2008) show that Bertrand competition is more profitable than Cournot competition, which contrasts with conventional wisdom. In this article, we first demonstrate that such a result is robust to the endogenous determination of the type of contract. Second, by introducing managerial incentives in the model, we find that delegation to managers may lead each firm to choose a quantity contract and, as long as products are sufficiently differentiated, entails conflicting choices causing nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies. Significantly high product substitutability reconciles firms’ objectives under delegation, leading unique or multiple equilibria with symmetric types of contracts to arise.