研討日期 |
2020年11月09日上午10:20~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學606討論室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
EXCLUSIVE DEALING: INVESTMENT PROMOTION MAY FACILITATE INEFFICIENT FORECLOSURE |
作者 Authors of the paper |
CHIARA FUMAGALLI, MASSIMO MOTTA, THOMAS
RØNDE |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS Volume LX, No. 4 |
主講人 |
Dang-Long Bui |
參加人員 |
王光正、王羿傑、施姵全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂文智、陳彥勳、許至乙 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing
(ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier.
Since ED promotes the incumbent seller’s investment, the seller and the buyer
realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the
parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient
entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The
paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible
investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED. |