研討日期

20201109日上午10:20~ 12:30

研討地點

國立臺灣大學606討論室

主講題目

Title of the paper

EXCLUSIVE DEALING: INVESTMENT PROMOTION MAY

FACILITATE INEFFICIENT FORECLOSURE

作者

Authors of the paper

CHIARA FUMAGALLI, MASSIMO MOTTA, THOMAS RØNDE

文獻出處

Journal, vol.(issue), pp

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS

Volume LX, No. 4

主講人

Dang-Long Bui

參加人員

王光正、王羿傑、施全、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、呂文智、陳彥勳、許至乙

摘要

Abstract of the paper

This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller’s investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.