研討日期 |
2020年10月26日上午10:20~ 12:30 |
研討地點 |
國立臺灣大學606討論室 |
主講題目 Title of the paper |
Technology licensing under successive monopoly |
作者 Authors of the paper |
Pei-Cyuan Shih,
Tsung-Han Chou, Hong Hwang, and Yan-Shu Lin |
文獻出處 Journal, vol.(issue), pp |
Working paper |
主講人 |
施姵全 |
參加人員 |
施姵全、王光正、林燕淑、梁文榮、彭正浩、黃鴻、丁虹仁、蔡文鋒、Damiana Simanjuntak、許雅媚、劉洋、洪珮瑜、林虢楙、呂文智、陳彥勳、許至乙 |
摘要 Abstract of the paper |
Assume
there is an outside innovator who owns a cost-reducing technology, which can
be applied to one of the production stages of the product in question. The
market structure of the industry is that of an n+1-stage successive
monopoly. We shall examine the optimal licensing contract and the production
stage the licensing to occur. It is found that the optimal licensing policy
is that of a two-part tariff when the licensing occurs at a middle production
stage. A pure fixed-fee is called for if the
licensing occurs at the upmost production stage. Moreover, if the production
technology exhibits a unitary input coefficient (i.e., one input to produce
one unit of the output), the licensor’s profit and social welfare are both
maximized when the licensing occurs at the upmost production stage. However,
this result may be overturned if the input coefficient of the production
technology is non-unitary. Furthermore, if the technology can be applied to
all the production stages, the licensor’s optimal licensing contract is to
charge a negative sum of royalty rates together with positive fixed-fees. |