研討日期

2010年12月11日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

題目

Technology licensing in a vertically differentiated duopoly with cost asymmetry

作者

Ray-Yun Chang and Cheng-Hau Peng

文獻出處

Working paper, 2010

報告人

張瑞雲

參加人員

李長英、佟家棟、黃鴻、梁文榮、陳宏易、王光正、林燕淑、彭正浩、張瑞雲、曹古駒、徐靖、劉亮君、莊復賢、高國峯、林晏如、張民忠、鐘暳陵、曾靜枝、王佳琪、丁虹仁、王羿傑、施姵全

摘要

By relaxing the zero-production-cost assumption, this paper re-examines technology licensing in a vertically differentiated a la Li and Song (2008). It is found that the difference of the marginal production costs for the high-quality firm and the low-quality firm determines the optimal licensing mode (contract) for the high-quality firm. If the high-quality can only adopt a one-part tariff licensing contract and the marginal cost of the high-quality firm is sufficiently high, fixed fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing. This result is different from Li and Song (2008), in which royalty licensing is always better than fee licensing. The two-part tariff licensing is also considered. We have found that the high-quality firm will offer a licensing contract with a fixed fee, a royalty or both, depending on the cost asymmetry between the two firms.

研究建議

延申模型至Bertrand 價格競爭，並進一步分析比較社會福利的大小。

備註