研討日期

2010年11月27日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

題目

Licensing a vertical product innovation

作者

Chang-Ying Li

Jun-Mei Wang

文獻出處

Economic Record 2010

報告人

曾靜枝

參加人員

黃鴻、梁文榮、陳宏易、王光正、張民忠、曾靜枝、周冰瑤、王佳琪、彭正浩、張瑞雲、莊復賢、周品旭、曹古駒、徐靖、高國峯、劉亮君、王羿傑、蔡明芳、鐘暳陵、涂光億、丁虹仁、施姵全

摘要

This paper studies the case where an outside patent holder licenses its vertical product innovation to two Cournot competitors. It is found that, under a fixed-fee contract, the patent holder prefers exclusive licensing. However, under a royalty or two-part tariff contract, the patent holder favors non-exclusive licensing. Moreover, in contrast to the standard argument by Kamien and Tauman, it show that, from the perspective of the patentee, royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing, if the degree of innovation is small. Two-part tariff licensing generates a monopoly outcome in the final market and hence reduces both consumer surplus and social welfare, if the innovation is low.

備註

We can analyze the optimal licensing contract under Bertrand competition as well as Cournot competition by taking an uncovered market into account.