研討日期	2010年10月23日12:00 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台大社會科學院26教室
題目	Imperfect price discrimination in a vertical differentiation model
作者	Qihong Liu, Konstantinos Serfes
文獻出處	IJIO(2005)
報告人	施姵全
參加人員	梁文榮、王光正、吳芝文、林燕淑、陳宏易、張民忠、彭正浩、曹古駒、劉亮君、徐靖、高國峯、林晏如、莊復賢、蔡明芳、王羿傑、涂光億、丁虹仁、施姵全
摘要	We explore the competitive implications of third-degree price discrimination based on consumer information of varying degrees of “precision” in a vertical differentiation duopoly model. We show that, if the cost of information is below a threshold, only the high quality firm will acquire it and offer targeted promotions, while the low quality firm will commit to a uniform price, for any degree of consumer information precision. Equilibrium profits of the high quality firm are monotonically increasing and that of the low quality firm monotonically decreasing as a function of the consumer information precision. Finally, social and consumer welfare are monotonically increasing with respect to the precision of consumer information.
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