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International Mergers: Incentives and
Welfare

 

 

Larry D. Qiu,

 

 Wen Zhou

 

 

Journal of International Economics

2006

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International mergers (or cross-border mergers) have recently become profuse. There is a sizable literature in industrial organization studies examining the profitability of mergers under various conditions. However, theses studies, except a few, provide no particular explanations for international mergers. The purpose of this paper is to provide a new explanation for international mergers in terms of information sharing.

 

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¡´          Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge.

¡´          The foreign firm and a domestic firm always want to share information, but output coordination is not always profitable, depending on the extent of product differentiation.

¡´          When demand uncertainty is large (small) and market competition is intense (weak), international mergers should be encouraged (discouraged).

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