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International Mergers:
Incentives and |
Larry D. Qiu, Wen Zhou |
Journal of International Economics 2006 |
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International mergers (or cross-border mergers) have recently become profuse. There is a sizable literature in industrial organization studies examining the profitability of mergers under various conditions. However, theses studies, except a few, provide no particular explanations for international mergers. The purpose of this paper is to provide a new explanation for international mergers in terms of information sharing. |
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¡´ Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. ¡´ The foreign firm and a domestic firm always want to share information, but output coordination is not always profitable, depending on the extent of product differentiation. ¡´
When demand uncertainty is large
(small) and market competition is intense (weak), international
mergers should be encouraged (discouraged). |
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