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Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger
Buyers Lower Prices? |
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Rajeev K.
Tyagi |
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Journal
of Industrial Economics, (2001) |
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The phenomenon of input suppliers charging
larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly
explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for
larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper
provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of
differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit
collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also
provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input
suppliers may lower consumer welfare. |
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