研討日期

2010年08月21日10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院26教室

題目

Strategic R&D with Technology Transfer and Welfare

作者

Ray-Yun Chang, Hong Hwang and Cheng-Hau Peng

文獻出處

Working paper

報告人

施姵全

參加人員

趙志鉅、黃鴻、梁文榮、彭正浩、曾靜枝、王佳琪、涂光億、莊復賢、徐靖、許凱威、高國峯、劉亮君、鐘暳陵、曹古駒、王羿傑、丁虹仁、張瑞雲、張民忠、林俊明、施姵全

 

摘要

We set up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) duopoly game in which only one of the two firms undertakes cost-reducing R&D and licenses the cost-reducing technology to the other firm. The technology licensing mode can be either royalty licensing (a per-unit fee) or fee licensing (a lump-sum fee). We compare the R&D investment and social welfare under three regimes: no licensing, royalty licensing and fee licensing. It is found that the positive strategic effect on R&D proposed by Brander and Spencer (1983) is reversed when licensing is considered. The effect of licensing does not necessarily raise the firm’s R&D as it depends on the R&D efficiency and the mode of the licensing. The R&D investment and social welfare are higher (lower) under no licensing than royalty licensing if the R&D efficiency is high (low). Namely, a royalty licensing is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. Moreover, the optimal R&D investment is necessarily higher, but the resulting social welfare is definitely lower under royalty licensing than under fee licensing.

 

備註