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The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition
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S. Delipalla and M. Keen |
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Journal of Public Economics 49 (1992) 351-367. |
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The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxes is one of the oldest issues in the formal study of public finance. This paper considers
an industry consisting of n identical firms producing a single homogeneous
product. Which compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of
oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively
low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low
profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare
perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific
taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem
taxation is welfare-improving, and in both models the maximisation
of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum
reliance on ad valorem taxation. |
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