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研討日期 |
2010年08月07日
10:20 ~ |
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研討地點 |
台灣大學社會科學院 第26教室 |
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討論題目 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
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Bundled
Discounts by Independent Producers of Vertically Differentiated Goods |
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Working paper, 2010 |
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報告人 |
鍾暳陵 |
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參加人員 |
黃鴻、王光正、林燕淑、陳宏易、彭正浩、曾靜枝、王羿傑、曹古駒、莊復賢、徐靖、許凱威、高國峯、林晏如、鍾暳陵、吳宜謙、周品旭、許至乙、周冰瑤、施姵全 |
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討論提要 |
Bundled discounts provide purchasers the opportunity to
pay less for a bundle of products than the sum of the prices of the bundle’s
constituent products when purchased separately. Despite the fact that bundled
discounts are a widespread business practice, the academic literature has
devoted limited attention to this issue. There are several examples of
bundled discounts in industries where, at least with respect to one of the
products in the bundle, differentiation is clearly vertical. To the best of
our knowledge, however, vertical differentiation has been neglected by the
extant literature on bundled discounts. |
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討論結果與建議 |
This paper studies the competitive effects of bundled discounts in a
setting where the component goods are vertically differentiated and sold by
otherwise unrelated firms. When firms decide simultaneously about their
participation in a discounting scheme, in equilibrium, both pairs of firms offer
bundled discounts and, relative to the no-bundling benchmark: (i) all headline prices rise; (ii) all bundle prices,
net of the discount, rise; and (iii) all firms earn
higher profits. Furthermore, the equilibrium corresponds to the worst
scenario in terms of consumer and social welfare, when compared to bundled discounts
only offered by a single pair of firms or to the no-bundling benchmark. 建議與延伸： (1)
進一步探究，在垂直相關模型中為何不會發生囚犯困境。 (2)
建構廠商可選擇將產品綁售與提供折扣的模型下，分析廠商的最 適搭售策略。 |
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備註 |
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