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A characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in Cournot oligopoly |
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Jingang
Zhao |
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IJIO(2001) |
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This paper characterizes the welfare effects of
cost reduction in a Cournot model with linear costs.
∙ Under linear demand, a
small reduction in a firm's marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its
market share is less than 1/(2n+2), or its marginal cost exceed a critical
level.
∙ A large cost reduction
by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice
the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value. |
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