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Vertical Integration Policies toward an Export-oriented Industry

Chin-Sheng Chen and Hong Hwang

Working paper

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The policy implication of vertical integration toward an export-oriented industry is very different from that toward a non-export-oriented industry. Salinger (1988, QJE) examines effects of vertical integration in a non-export-oriented industry and concludes that if the total output of the final good increases after vertical integration, the social welfare will also increase. This paper employs a model of successive oligopoly to investigate the policy implications of vertical integration toward an export-oriented industry. It is found that as the number of vertically-integrated firms increases, the social welfare of the domestic country enhances only if the exports decrease. The model is then extended to consider the cases of which there are foreign firms competing with domestic firms in the foreign market or the output of the final good is sold to both the domestic and the foreign market. It is shown that vertical integration which reduces domestic exports may not be advantageous to the domestic welfare.