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Vertical Integration Policies toward an Export-oriented Industry |
Chin-Sheng Chen and Hong Hwang |
Working paper |
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The policy implication of vertical integration
toward an export-oriented industry is very different from that toward a non-export-oriented
industry. Salinger (1988, QJE) examines effects of vertical integration in a non-export-oriented
industry and concludes that if the total output of the final good increases
after vertical integration, the social welfare will also increase. This paper
employs a model of successive oligopoly to investigate the policy
implications of vertical integration toward an export-oriented industry. It
is found that as the number of vertically-integrated firms increases, the
social welfare of the domestic country enhances only if the exports decrease.
The model is then extended to consider the cases of which there are foreign
firms competing with domestic firms in the foreign market or the output of
the final good is sold to both the domestic and the foreign market. It is shown that vertical integration
which reduces domestic exports may not be advantageous to the domestic
welfare. |