研討日期

2010年07月03日上午10:20 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台灣大學社會科學院   法26教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Innovation, licensing, and price vs. quantity competition

 

Changying Li

Xiaoming Ji

 

Economic Modelling

 

報告人

王羿傑

參加人員

梁文榮    陳宏易    王佳琪    王羿傑    鍾暳陵    施姵全    高國峰    莊復賢    曾靜枝    林晏如    丁虹仁    劉亮君    王光正

論文提要

    In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing.

    We show that, with licensing, the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) is completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.

備註

The optimal royalty rate in the appendix can be checked again. Besides, authors do not explain how to calculate the optimal royalty rate.