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Differentiated
duopoly with asymmetric costs |
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Piercarlo Zanchettin |
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Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006,
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In this paper,
the authors compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand
and cost functions. This paper extends the Singh and Vives
(1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product
quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods,
it shows that both the efficient firms¡¦
profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when
asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore,
Singh and Vives¡¦s ranking of profits between the two modes
of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter
space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, it also shows
that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm;s and industry profits, implying that a local
incentive towards less differentiation may arise. |
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