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Differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs

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Piercarlo Zanchettin

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Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006,

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In this paper, the authors compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with linear demand and cost functions. This paper extends the Singh and Vives (1984) model by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand (product quality) asymmetry between firms. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, it shows that both the efficient firms¡¦ profits and industry profits are higher under Bertrand competition when asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly differentiated. Therefore, Singh and Vives¡¦s ranking of profits between the two modes of competition is reversed in a sizeable portion of the relevant parameter space. Contrary to the standard result with symmetric firms, it also shows that product differentiation can reduce both the efficient firm;s and industry profits, implying that a local incentive towards less differentiation may arise.

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