研討日期

研討日期	2010年06月19日 10:20 ~ 13:00
研討地點	台灣大學社會科學院第26教室
討論題目	題目	作者	文獻出處
	Optimal Cross Holding with Externalities and Strategic Interactions	Matthew J. Clayton and Bjorn N. Jorgensen	Journal of Business, 2005, vol.78, no. 4 pp.1505-1522
報告人	鍾暳陵
參加人員	黃鴻梁文榮陳宏易林燕淑莊復賢劉亮君高國峰曹古駒曾靜枝王羿傑蔡明芳張瑞雲許淑媖張民忠涂光億徐靖彭正浩丁虹仁鍾暳陵施姵全林晏如陳金盛
討論提要	Cross holding, defined as one firm having an equity position (long or short) in another firm, arises in various industries. This paper analyzes the role of cross holding among publicly traded firms that generate externalities. We analyze a two period setting where firms first choose equity positions in each other and second engage in operating activities that cause externalities.
討論結果與建議	Firms facing positive externalities optimally choose long equity positions to increase their profits. Firms facing negative externalities encounter a prisoner’ dilemma, where each firm optimally chooses short positions in the first period, committing to a more aggressive operating stance that results in lower profits. In contrast to the prior literature, regulation restricting cross holdings reduces consumer surplus and economic welfare when the number of firms is fixed. However, such regulation can increase entry , improving new welfare. 延伸沿用此篇以“持股方式進行異業結盟”的概念與搭售後結盟廠商提供折扣的議題進行結合，以解釋電信系統商與通路代理商的結盟趨勢，進一步分析廠商交叉持股如何影響搭售後的折扣及搭售下廠商的結盟行為對社會福利的影響。
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